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"COULD" THIS BE THE END OF FOURTH
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS FOR
MOTORISTS?
Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Whren v. United States,' the Supreme Court established a brightline rule that a police officer's traffic stop is justified by probable
cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.2 The Court declined to adopt a standard that would take police officers' subjective
motivations into account, asserting that "[s]ubjective intentions play
3
no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."
Thus, the Court, with its decision, legitimated a purely objective
"could" test, which simply asks whether a police officer "could have"
4
stopped a vehicle for a traffic infraction.
This Note argues that the Court's decision to adopt a purely objective approach to police traffic stops is problematic. First, this Note
asserts that the Court's bright-line rule actually facilitates arbitrary
searches and seizures, and, therefore, runs counter to the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment. Second, this Note maintains that the
Court's purely objective approach facilitates and, indeed, protects, the
use of impermissible bases by police officers to effect traffic stops, and
that the Court's proposed remedy to this problem-the Equal Protection Clause-is insufficient. Finally, this Note contends that, in light
of the above consequences and competing objectives and issues, the
Court should have adopted a modified objective standard-a "totality
of the circumstances" approach-that takes police officers' subjective
intentions into account, as such a standard is fully consistent with
Supreme Court precedent.

1 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).

2 Id. at 1777.
3 Id. at 1774.
4 For a discussion of the "could" test, see infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
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II.
A.

BACKGROUND

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the violation of "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures .... ."5 In order "to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions," 6 the Amendment imposes a
standard of "reasonableness" upon the discretion of government officials. 7 Invasions are "arbitrary" if they are "conducted at the discretion of executive officials, who may act despotically and capriciously in
the exercise of the power to search and seize."8 Indeed, a law enforcement officer "must be able to point to specific and articulable facts"
9
before he can effect a seizure or undertake a search.
B.

PRETEXTUAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE

A pretextual search or seizure is one conducted by law enforcement officers at least partially for reasons other than the justifications
later submitted by the government. 10 In other words, activity is
pretextual when law enforcement officers engage in conduct on the
basis of constitutionally invalid reasons, but behave in an "objectively
reasonable" way. 1 This allows prosecutors to later justify police conduct by utilizing a valid Fourth Amendment rationale that is consistent with the conduct's "objective appearance."' 2 For example, a
pretextual investigatory stop occurs when a police officer, who lacks
the requisite "reasonable suspicion" to conduct a search of an automobile and its occupants for drugs, uses a sound justification, such as
a traffic violation, as a pretext to pull over the automobile and conduct the search.' 3
C.

THE SUPREME COURT'S PRETEXT DOCTRINE

Previous to Whren, the Supreme Court offered little useful guidance regarding pretextual investigatory activity. Describing the doc5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

6 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
7 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979).
8 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MiNN. L. REv. 349,
411 (1974).
9 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
10 See Andrew J. Pulliam, Note, Developing a Meaningful Fourth Amendment Approach to
Automobile Investigatoy Stops, 47 VANo. L. Rv,. 477, 479 (1994).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 See id.
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trine, one commentator said:
The pretextual search doctrine lies between two distinct and important
considerations: (1) unfettered police discretion leading to arbitrary intrusions into the private rights of everyday citizens 4and (2) unproductive
inquiries into a police officer's subjective intent.'
Indeed, several of the Court's cases prior to Whren suggest that governmental employment of pretext and unbridled discretion is unconstitutional. Conversely, some of the Court's other cases favor "objective"
standards of review that do not require courts to engage in a subjective investigation into the officer's state of mind.
1.

Early Supreme Court Disapprovalof Governmental Use of Pretext and
Unbridled Discretion-Lefkowitz, Abel, and Terry

An early example of Supreme Court condemnation of government agents' use of pretext occurred in United States v. Lejkowitz.' 5 In
Lejkowitz, government agents arrested the respondent for conspiracy
to violate the National Prohibition Act, and made subsequent searches
and seizures of the respondent's property.' 6 In deciding whether the
searches and seizures were reasonable as incidental to the arrest, the
Court asserted in dicta that "[a]n arrest may not be used as a pretext
17
to search for evidence."
In Abel v. United States,'8 the Supreme Court again indicated disapproval with governmental pretextual activity. 1 9 In Abel, the F.B.I.
suspected the petitioner, an illegal alien, of espionage but did not possess sufficient evidence to make an arrest.2 0 The F.B.I. notified immigration officials as to the petitioner's illegal status.2 ' After the
immigration officials arrested the petitioner, the F.B.I. agents immediately searched his hotel room. 2 2 Speaking for the Court, Justice
Frankfurter upheld the search, premising his ruling on the district
court's finding that the government agents acted in good faith. 23
Frankfurter noted, however, that had the district court found "bad
faith" on the part of the agents, "it would indeed reveal a serious misconduct by law enforcing officers... [that] must meet stern resistance
14 Id. at 517.
15

285 U.S. 452 (1932).

16 Id. at 458.
17 Id. at 467.
18

362 U.S. 217 (1960).

19 See idt at 226.

20
21
22
23

Id.at
Id. at
Id. at
Id at

221.
222-23.
225.
226-28.
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by the courts." 24 The Abel Court thus seemed to suggest that "bad
faith" pretextual intrusions were not constitutionally valid.
Lastly, the Supreme Court denounced the use of unbridled discretion by police officers in the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio,2 5 as it

condemned police usage of "inarticulate hunches" to justify intrusions.26 In Terry, a police officer stopped and frisked the defendant

on a city street, basing his action on the defendant's "suspicious" behavior. 27 The Court stated that:
[I]njustifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. The
scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is
assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing
the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a
judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or
seizure in light of the particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective
standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the
seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief'
that the action taken was appropriate. Anything less would invite intrusions
upon constitutionallyguaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than
28
inarticulatehunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction.
Thus, while Terry created an "objective" test, the "evil" against which
the test was directed-the "hunch"-is, as one commentator describes, "most assuredly a creature of the officer's subjective
29
consciousness.",
2.

The Supreme Court Addresses Traffic Violation Arrests-Robinson
and Gustafson

The Supreme Court seemed to favor objective standards of review
as it addressed issues involving traffic violation arrests in the companion cases of United States v. Robinson3 0 and Gustafson v. Florida.3 1 In
Robinson, a police officer pulled over and arrested the respondent for
driving an automobile after the revocation of his license.- 2 The officer subsequently searched him, resulting in the discovery of her24

Id. at 226.

25 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

Id- at 22.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 21-22 (emphasis added).
29 Scott Campbell, Comment, United States v.Ferguson: The Sixth CircuitAdds a Third Test
for PretextuaIPolice Conduc4 56 OHIO ST. LJ.277, 294 (1995).
30 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
31 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
32 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 220.
26
27
28
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oin.3 3 The Court, in a footnote, rejected the respondent's claim that

the arrest for a traffic violation served simply as pretext for a police
officer to conduct a narcotics search.34 The Court stated: "We think it
is sufficient for purposes of our decision that [the] respondent was
lawfully arrested for an offense and that... placing him in custody
following that arrest was not a departure from established police department practice."35 Furthermore, the Court did not take subjective
factors into account.3 6
In Gustafson, a police officer pulled over and arrested the petitioner for failure to produce a driver's license.3 7 The officer subsequently searched him, resulting in the discovery of marijuana
cigarettes.3 8 The petitioner argued for suppression of the marijuana,
claiming that, unlike Robinson, there was neither a police regulation
that obligated the officer to take the petitioner into custody, nor a
police policy requiring body searches upon field arrests.3 9 The Court
rejected these differences as not "determinative of the constitutional
issue," holding that it was "sufficient that the officer had probable
cause to arrest the petitioner and that he lawfully effectuated the
40
arrest and placed the petitioner in custody."
3. Supreme Court Concern Over Unfettered Police Discretion-BrignoniPonce and Opperman
The Court exhibited a substantial concern for unfettered police
discretion in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.4 1 At issue in Brignoni-Ponce
was the constitutionality of a U.S. Border Patrol policy that allowed
roving patrols near the Mexican border to stop vehicles and question
occupants about their immigration status and citizenship based solely
on the occupants' apparent Mexican ancestry. 42 Referring to the
hazards posed by unobstructed government power, the Court held
that this policy was unconstitutional. 43 The Court noted that "the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment demands something more than the broad and unlimited discretion sought by the
33 i& at 223.

34 Id at 221 n.1.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 236. The Robinson court proclaimed that since the custodial arrest gave rise to

the authority to search, the fact that the police officer did not indicate subjective fear of
the respondent and did not believe that the respondent was armed was irrelevant. Id.
37 Gustafson v Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 262 (1973).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 263.

40 Id. at 265.
41 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
42 Id. at 874-76.
43 Id. at 882-83.
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Government," and warned that "l[t] o approve roving patrol stops...
without any suspicion... would subject residents of these and other
areas to potentially unlimited interference with their use of the highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers." 44
In South Dakota v. Opperman,45 the Supreme Court again criticized
police use of pretext. The Court concluded that inventory searches
made pursuant to standardized police procedures were reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, stating that "there [was] no suggestion
whatever that [the] standard procedure.., was a pretext concealing
an investigatory police motive." 46 The Opperman court seemed to imply, as one commentator noted, "that the absence of a standard procedure would provide objective evidence of... a pretextual motive-a
subjective state of mind ... ."4 While the Court did not declare this
"subjective state of mind" unconstitutional, it certainly seemed trou4
bled by it.
4. Supreme Court Enunciation of a Purely Objective Approach-Scott
49
The Court took a different approach in Scott v. United States,
which signalled the first Supreme Court enunciation of an entirely
objective approach to search and seizure issues. 50 Indeed, Scott
seemed to discard the claim that officers' conduct could be unlawful
based on their subjective motivation. In Scott, federal agents intercepted the defendant's telephone conversations pursuant to an authorized wiretap, but did not make a good faith effort to minimize the
interception of calls unrelated to the investigation. 5 1 The pertinent
issue was whether the federal agents' failure to comply with the minimization requirement of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 196852 violated the Fourth Amendment.5 - In concluding that
the agents' activity was constitutional, the Court held that the appropriate standard for evaluation of alleged Fourth Amendment violations was one of "objective reasonableness without regard to the
underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved."5 4 The Court

Id. at 882.
428 U.S. 364 (1976).
46 Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376.
47 Campbell, supranote 29, at 297.
48 Id.
44
45

49 436 U.S. 128 (1978).

50 Laurie A. Buckenberger, PretextualArrests: In United States v. Scopo the Second Circuit
Raises the Price of a Traffic Ticket (Considerably), 61 BROOK. L. REV. 453, 467 (1995).
51 Scot4 436 U.S. at 132-34.
52 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976).
53 Scott; 436 U.S. at 135.
54 Id. at 138.

870
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essentially pronounced that a law enforcement official's subjective
intent alone would not make otherwise lawful conduct
unconstitutional. 55
5.

The "Refinement" of the Supreme Court's Investigatory Stop DoctrineFrom Prouse to Wells

In Delaware v. Prouse,56 the Court attempted to refine its investigatory stop doctrine. In Prouse, police officers, acting without probable
cause or reasonable suspicion that drivers were operating their vehicles in violation of the law, conducted routine stops of vehicles to
check operators' driver's licenses and automobile registrations. 57 The
Court held that the stops and subsequent detentions of motorists, absent "at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist" had
violated the law, were "unreasonable," and, thus, unconstitutional. 5 8
The Court further proclaimed that "persons in automobiles on public
roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy
interfered with at the unbridled discretion of police officers." 59
The Court's invalidation of an officer's pedestrian stop in Brown
v. Texas60 further contributed to the investigatory stop doctrine.6 ' In
Brown, two policemen stopped and questioned the defendant after
seeing him walk away from another man in an alley known to have a
high incidence of drug activity. 62 In reversing the defendant's conviction, the Court held that:
the Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require
the seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on
55 See id. at 135-37. The Court addressed the pretext issue again, albeit briefly, in United
States v. 'amonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983). In V lamonte-Marques, customs officers,
after receiving an informant's tip about a drug shipment, boarded a sailboat to inspect the
ship's documents pursuant to a federal statute. Id. at 584 n.3. The Court upheld the respondents' drug convictions, dismissing the respondents' argument that the search of the
ship was based on a pretextual motive. Id. The Court offered little insight into the pretext
issue, stating, in a footnote:
Respondents. . . contend... that because the ... officers ... were following an
informant's tip that a vessel in the ship channel was thought to be carrying marihuana
[sic], they may not rely on the statute authorizing boarding for inspection of the vessel's documentation. This line of reasoning was rejected in a similar situation in Scott
v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 135-39 (1978), and we again reject it.
Id. The Court gave no further indication as to what "line of reasoning" it was referring.
56 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
57 Id. at 650.
58 Id. at 663.
59 Id.
60 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
61 Pulliam, supra note 10, at 497.
62 Brown, 443 U.S. at 48-49.
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the conduct of individual officers. 63

Two years later, in United States v. Cortez,64 the Court found, in
upholding an investigatory stop of a pickup truck, that "detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
particular person stopped of criminal activity." 65 The Court noted
that constitutionally sufficient reasonable suspicion required two necessary elements. 66 First, the "officer's assessment of the entire. situation must be based upon all of the circumstances." 67 Second, the
officer's assessment "must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing." 68 Despite the Cortez
Court's attempt to clarify the investigatory stop doctrine, the standard
of reasonable suspicion in the area of investigatory stops remained
vague.69
The Court reiterated its bright-line "objective reasonableness"
standard in Maryland v. Macon.70 In Macon, an undercover police
detective purchased two magazines from an adult bookstore. 71 After
meeting with fellow officers and concluding that the magazines were
obscene, the detectives returned to the store and arrested the respondent.72 At this time, they also retrieved the marked fifty-dollar bill the
detective used to make the purchase from the cash register. 7 3 The
officers failed to return the change given to the detective upon the
original purchase. 74 Arguing that the detectives' subjective intent to
retrieve the marked bill without returning the change converted the
"purchase" into an illegal seizure, the respondent moved to suppress
the magazines. 75 The Court concluded that the detectives' subjective
intent was irrelevant in the inquiry, noting that "[o]bjectively viewed,
Id. at 51.
64 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
65 Id. at 417-18.
63

66 Id. at 418.
67 Id

68 Id.
69 Pulliam, supranote 10, at 498. The trend of objective inquiry that was developing in

cases such as Brown and Cortez was not without its "blips"-i.e. cases that were concerned
with police use of pretext. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bannister,449 U.S. 1 (1980) (per curiam).
In Bannister,a police officer stopped a motorist for speeding, and, upon his approach to
the side of the car, saw items matching the description of some that had been recently
stolen in the vicinity. Id. at 2. The officer subsequently arrested the occupants of the
automobile on charges unrelated to the original stop. Id. In a footnote, the Court stated:
"There was no evidence whatsoever that the officer's presence to issue a traffic citation was
a pretext to confirm any other previous suspicion about the occupants." Id. at 4 n.4.
70 472 U.S. 463 (1985).
71 Id. at 465.
72 Id73 Id.

74 Id.
75

Id. at 470.
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the transaction was a sale in the ordinary course of business... [and]
is not retrospectively transformed into a warrantless seizure by virtue
of the officer's subjective intent to retrieve the purchase money to use
'76
as evidence.
Despite the conclusion in Macon that subjective motives were irrelevant, the Court, in subsequent cases, indicated that it was concerned with unhindered police discretion. In Colorado v. Bertine,77 the
Court approved a police officer's inventory search, stating that "there
was no showing that the police, who were following standardized pro78
cedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation."
In New York v. Burger,79 the Court upheld an administrative junkyard
inspection, noting that "[t]here is ... no reason to believe that the
instant inspection was actually a 'pretext' for obtaining evidence of
respondent's violation of the penal laws." 80 And in Floridav. Wells, 8'
the Court struck down an inventory search because the Florida Highway Patrol did not have a "standardized criteria or established routine" for the search, mentioning that "an inventory search must not be
a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating
'8 2
evidence.
As this examination of pretext cases indicates, the Supreme
Court's pret-xtual search doctrine is far from clear. On many occasions, the Court suggests that governmental use of pretext and unfettered discretion is unconstitutional. On other occasions, the Court
patently eschews investigations into a government agent's subjective
state of mind.
D.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT TREATMENT OF PRETEXTUAL POLICE
ACTIVITY

As a result of the uncertain guidance of the Supreme Court, the
Circuit Courts of Appeal have employed two different approaches to
determine the validity of pretextual challenges to temporary deten84
83
tions of motorists-the "could" test and the "would" test.
76

Id. at 471.

77 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
78 Id. at 372.
79

482 U.S. 691 (1987).

80 Id. at 716 n.27.

81 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
82 Id. at 4.
83 See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
84 See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
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1.

The "Could" Test

The majority of circuits have adopted the purely objective "could"
Under this test, an officer's investigative stop of a motor vehicle
is constitutionally valid under the Fourth Amendment "if the officer
could have stopped the vehicle for a traffic infraction."8 6 In other
words, so long as a police officer pulls over a driver for a traffic violation, the stop is protected. Under the "could" test, police officers'
motives are irrelevant and not subject to inquiry "so long as police do
no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to
do .... "87 The "could" test thus ignores the officer's subjective intent
as well as the possibility that the stop was made on the basis of discriminatory animus. 88 Therefore, this test places only a minimal limitation
on police discretion: the jurisdiction's motor vehicle operation statute.89 This is significant because ajurisdiction's motor vehicle operatest.8 5

tion statute is "usually a highly detailed regulatory code that, if
enforced rigidly, would eventually snare even the most punctilious,
perfectionist driver." 90
2.

The "Would" Test

The "would" test, adopted by a minority of circuits, 91 is a modified objective test. The Eleventh Circuit enunciated the test in United
States v. Smith,92 a case in which the court found that a police officer's
85 Eight circuits have adopted the "could" test. See United States v. Botero-Ospinoza, 71
F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 2529 (1996); United States
v.Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 245-47 (3rd Cir. 1995); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 782-84
(2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Jeffus, 22 F.3d 554, 557 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Myers, 990 F.2d 1083, 1085 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Mitchell, 951 F.2d 1291, 1295
(D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Trigg, 925 F.2d 1064, 1065 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 962 (1991); United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1185 (5th Cir. 1987) (en
banc). The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 1993), adopted a
variation that is functionally similar to the "could" test. The Ferguson court held that:
so long as the officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred
or was occurring, the resulting stop is not unlawful and does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. We focus ... on whether this particular officer in fact had probable
cause to believe that a traffic offense had occurred, regardless of whether this was the
only basis or merely one basis for the stop. . . It is also irrelevant whether the stop in
question is sufficiently ordinary or routine according to the general practice of the
police department or the officer making the stop.
Id. at 391. For further discussion of this variation, see generally Campbell, supranote 29.
86 Campbell, supra note 29, at 280 (emphasis added).
87 United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
88 Campbell, supranote 29, at 280.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Two circuits have adopted the "would" test. See United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472,
474-76 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Valdez, 931 F.2d 1448, 1450 (11th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1986).
92 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986).
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stop of the defendant's automobile based on a quick instance of
"weaving" was unreasonable:9 3 "[I]n determining when an investigatory stop is unreasonably pretextual, the proper inquiry... is ...
whether under the same circumstances a reasonable officer would
have made the stop in the absence of the invalid purpose. .. ."94 The
courts adopting this test agree with the "could" courts that the appropriate examination of the facts and circumstances of a pretextual traffic stop is an objective one. 95 However, these courts disagree with the
"could" courts regarding the nature of the objective elements used in
the inquiry.9 6 One commentator framed the issue well, stating that
the "would" test
establishes a modest judicial check on police, by imposing a "believability" standard: While an officer may profess to have been concerned with
traffic safety, do the circumstances, or, for example, local citation-writing
statistics, suggest that the stop would not have taken place if the driver
were not in an unusual place at an unusual time, or of the wrong racial
or ethnic background, or already under observation for some graver offense? The "would" test also proclaims, at least by implication, that the
motor vehicle statutes should not be a means9to
the end of, say, narcotics
7
law enforcement, but an end in themselves.
The courts utilizing the "would" standard reason that it is the proper
standard because it affords advantageous judicial review of discretionary police conduct while providing the requirement of an objective
inquiry into Fourth Amendment action. 9 8
III.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the evening ofJune 10, 1993, plain-clothes District of Columbia police officers were patrolling a "high drug area" of Washington,
D.C. in an unmarked car. 99 Officers Efraim Soto, Jr. and Homer Littlejohn were in a car driven by another officer, Investigator Tony
Howard. 10 0 As the officers turned left off of 37th Place onto Ely Place,
Officer Soto noticed a dark Nissan Pathfinder with temporary license
plates at a stop sign on 37th Place in a school zone. 10 The Pathfinder's driver, James L. Brown, was looking down into the lap of the
passenger to his right, Michael A. Whren. 0 2 As the officers pro93
94

95
96
97

98
99

Id. at 711.
I& at 706-07 (emphasis added).
Pulliam, supra note 10, at 484-85.
Id. at 485.
Campbell, supra note 29, at 280.
Pulliam, supranote 10, at 485.
Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996).
United States v. Whren, 53 F.Sd 371, 372 (1995).

100
101 Id.
102 Id.
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ceeded slowly onto 37th Place, Soto continued to watch the Pathfinder, which remained stopped at the intersection for more than 20
seconds, obstructing at least one car behind it.103 Officer Soto's suspicions aroused, the officers initiated a U-turn in order to continue surveillance of the Pathfinder. 10 4 As the officers executed the U-turn, the
Pathfinder suddenly turned right onto Ely Place without signalling.' 0 5
The Pathfinder "sped off quickly" and proceeded at an "unreasonable
6
speed."'10
The officers followed the Pathfinder and pulled up parallel to the
vehicle when it stopped behind other traffic at an intersection. 0 7 At
this point, Officer Soto did not intend to issue a traffic ticket.'0 8 He
only wished to ask the driver of the Pathfinder why he obstructed traffic and sped off without signalling.' 0 9 Officer Soto exited the unmarked car and approached the driver's-side door of the
Pathfinder. 0 After identifying himself as a police officer, he directed
the driver to put the vehicle in park."' As he spoke, Officer Soto
noticed that the passenger, Whren, held two large bags of what he
suspected to be crack cocaine."12 The officers immediately arrested
Brown and Whren, both of whom were African-American, 113 and
searched the Pathfinder, recovering several types of illegal drugs, in4
cluding marijuana laced with PCP and crack cocaine."
Brown and Whren were charged in a four-count indictment with
(1) possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine
base, or crack, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (a) (1) and
841(b) (1) (A) (iii); (2) possession with intent to distribute cocaine
base within 1000 feet of a school in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a); (3)
possession of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a); and (4)
possession of phencyclidine (PCP) in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 844(a)."

5

Brown and Whren moved to suppress the physical evidence." 6
They argued that the traffic stop had not been merited by probable
103
104
105
106
107

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
108 Id. at 373.
109 Id.
110 Id. at

372-73.

111 Id. at 373.
112 Id.
113 Whren, 116 S.Ct. at 1773.
114 Whren, 53 F.3d at 373.
115
116

Id. at 372.
Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772.
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cause or even reasonable suspicion to believe that they had been engaged in illegal narcotics activity, and that the officers' asserted
ground for stopping the Pathfinder was pretextual. 117 The district
court noted that the facts surrounding the traffic stop were not disputed and that there was no evidence that demonstrated that the officers' actions were different from those of an ordinary traffic stop.' 18
Accordingly, the court concluded that the government demonstrated
that the officers' conduct was "appropriate" and denied the suppression motion." 19 Brown and Whren were subsequently convicted on all
20
four counts.
On appeal, Brown and Whren urged the Court of Appeals for the
12
District of Columbia Circuit to adopt the minority view "would" test. '
In rejecting Brown and Whren's argument, the court utilized the
"could" standard employed by the majority of circuits. 122 The Court
stated two reasons why the majority rule provided a "more principled
method of determining reasonableness."' 2 3 First, consistent with previous Supreme Court admonitions, it eliminated the need for a court
to inquire into the subjective state of mind of a police officer. 124 Second, it provided a "principled limitation" on the abuse of police
power, as police officers could not stop a vehicle "unless they ha[d]
probable cause to believe a traffic violation ha[d] occurred or a reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct based upon articulable
facts."' 25 Applying this standard to the instant facts, the appeals court
found that the officers had probable cause to stop the Pathfinder because they witnessed Brown's traffic violations. 12 6 Accordingly, the
court rejected the defendants' Fourth Amendment arguments, and
127
sustained their convictions.
117 Id.
118 Whren, 53 F.3d at 373.
19 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 374. For a discussion of the "would" test, see supranotes 91-98 and accompany-

ing text.
122 Whren, 53 F.3d at 375. For a discussion of the "could" test, see supra notes 85-90 and
accompanying text.
123 Whren, 53 F.3d at 375.
124 Id.

Id. at 376.
126 Id. The provisions of the District of Columbia traffic code that the officers had probable cause to believe Brown had violated were D.C. MUN. RE.s., tit. 18, §§ 2213.4 (1995)
("An operator shall ... give full time and attention to the operation of the vehicle");
2204.3 ("No person shall turn any vehicle . .. without giving an appropriate signal");
2200.3 ("No person shall drive a vehicle.. . at a speed greater than is reasonable and
prudent under the conditions."). Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772-73 (1996).
127 Whren, 53 F.3d at 376.
125
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari' 28 to consider whether the officers' temporary detention of Brown and Whren
violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable
129
searches and seizures.
IV.

SUMMARY OF THE COURT'S OPINION

In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Scalia, the United
States Supreme Court endorsed "the traditional common-law rule that
130
probable cause justifies a search and seizure" in "run-of-the-mine"
cases. 13 1 Utilizing this rule, the Court found that the traffic stop at
issue was "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment, and upheld the
132
petitioners' convictions.
The Court began its opinion with a review of the requirements
articulated in Delawarev. Prouse133 regarding the temporary detention
of motorists. 3 4 The Court asserted that only "reasonable" temporary
detentions of motorists pass constitutional muster and then concluded that "reasonable" meant probable cause existed to believe a
35
traffic violation has occurred.'
Next, the Court addressed the petitioners' contention that the
"reasonable" probable cause standard was not sufficient "in the
unique context of civil traffic regulations" and that the Fourth
Amendment test for traffic stops should instead be whether a "reasonable" police officer, "would have made the stop for the reason
given."' 3 6 The Court declared petitioners' reliance on Florida v.
Wells,' 3 7 Colorado v. Bertine,'3 8 and New York v. Burgert 3 9 to be misplaced, stating that "only an undiscerning reader would regard these
cases as endorsing the principle that ulterior motives can invalidate
police conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause to be128 Whren v. United States, 116 S.CL 1769 (1996).
129 Id. at 1771-72.
130 "Run-of-the-mine" is defined as "ordinary, mediocre, run-of-mill." WEaSTER'S THIRD
NEv INTERNATIONAL DiarioNARY 1990 (1966).
131 Wren, 116 S. CL at 1777.
132 Id.
133 440 U.S. 648 (1979). For a further discussion of this case, see supra notes 56-59 and

accompanying text.
134
135
136
137

Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772.
Id.
Id. at 1773.

495 U.S.
accompanying
138 479 U.S.
accompanying
139 482 U.S.
accompanying

1 (1990). For a further discussion of this case, see supra notes 81-82 and
text.
367 (1987). For a further discussion of this case, see supranotes 77-78 and
text.
691 (1987). For a further discussion of this case, see supranotes 79-80 and
text.
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lieve that violation of law has occurred."1 40 The Court likewise discarded the petitioners' reliance upon Colorado v. Bannister,"14 stating
that the dictum upon which they relied only demonstrated the Bannistercourt's decision not to inquire into the issue at hand, not that it was
42
certain of the issue's resolution.'
The Court then buttressed its endorsement of the Prouse probable cause standard with a discussion of United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,1 4 3 United States v. Robinson,"44 and Scott v. United States"45 to

foreclose the petitioners' argument that ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct justified on the basis of probable cause. 14 6 While
the Court agreed with the petitioners that the Constitution prohibited
"selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as
race," 147 it articulated that the Equal Protection Clause, not the
Fourth Amendment, serves as the constitutional basis for objecting to
the intentionally discriminatory application of laws. 1 48 The Court added that "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable
1 49
cause Fourth Amendment analysis."
Next, the opinion examined the petitioners' proposed standard
of "whether the officer's conduct deviated materially from usual police practices, so that a reasonable officer in the same circumstances
would not have made the stop for the reasons given."15 0 The petitioners argued that their standard was not "subjective" and, therefore, not
inappropriate under the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.151 The Court disagreed, finding that the proposed test,
even though couched in empirical terms, was "plainly and indisputably driven by subjective considerations," and was clearly designed to
combat the perceived "danger" of pretextual stops.' 52 The Court also
asserted that the petitioners' standard conflicted with prior Supreme
14
141

Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773.
449 U.S. 1 (1980) (per curiam). Fora further discussion of this case, see supranote

69.
142 Whren, 116 S.Ct. at 1773. The Court characterized petitioners' reliance on a statement in the per curiam Bannisteropinion as an indication of the Supreme Court's reversal
of prior law as "anomalous, to say the least." Id. at 1774.
143 462 U.S. 579 (1983). For a further discussion of this case, see supra note 55.
144 414 U.S. 218 (1973). For a further discussion of this case, see supra notes 30-36 and

accompanying text.
145 436 U.S. 128 (1978). For a further discussion of this case, see supra notes 49-55 and
accompanying text.
146 Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.
147 Id.

148

Id.

149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152

Id.
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Court directives, stating that the Fourth Amendment's concern with
"reasonableness" allowed certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, regardless of the officer's subjective intent-5 3 Continuing its criticism, the Court said it would be "somewhat easier to figure
out the intent of an individual officer than to plumb the collective
consciousness of law enforcement in order to determine whether a
'reasonable officer' would have been moved to act upon the traffic
violation."' 54 While the Court acknowledged that police manuals and
standard procedures might sometimes provide objective assistance in
determining whether a "reasonable officer" would have acted upon a
traffic violation, it concluded that "speculating about the hypothetical
reaction of a hypothetical constable" would be "an exercise that might
155
be called virtual subjectivity."
Moreover, the Court maintained that Fourth Amendment search
and seizure protections could not depend on police enforcement
practices that varied among jurisdictions. 56 The Court utilized the
petitioners' case to illustrate the difficulty of relying on local police
practice to define Fourth Amendment protections. 157 The petitioners
claimed that a "reasonable officer" would not have stopped the Pathfinder because the operative District of Columbia police regulations
permitted plainclothes officers in unmarked vehicles to enforce traffic
laws "only in the case of a violation that is so grave as to pose an immediate threat to the safety of others." 5 8 The Court noted that it could
not apply this test in jurisdictions that employed different practices. 59
Additionally, the Court noted that this ground of invalidation would
not have even applied in the District of Columbia "if Officer Soto had
160
been wearing a uniform or patrolling in a marked police cruiser."
The Court then refuted the petitioners' claim that Supreme
Court precedent required police to adhere to standard procedures as
an objective method of eliminating the use of pretext. 16' The Court
asserted that the petitioners cited no holding to support their argument, and that they improperly relied on dicta from Abel v. United
States16 2 and United States v. Robinson.'6 3 The Court denied that indica153
154

Id. at 1774-75.
Id. at 1775.

155
156
'57
158

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. (quoting Metropolitan Police Dep't, Washington, D.C., General Order 303.1,
pt.1, Objectives and Policies (A) (2) (4) (Apr. 30, 1992), reprinted inAddendum to Brief for
Petitioners, Whren (No. 95-5841)).
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162

362 U.S. 217 (1960). For further discussion of this case, see supra notes 18-24 and
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tions in the Abel decision amounted to a "proposition that failure to
follow regular procedures proves (or is an operational substitute for)
pretext." 164 Moreover, the Court continued by stating that Abel "did
not involve the assertion that pretext could invalidate a search or,
seizure for which there was probable cause."' 6 5 With regard to Robinson, the Court noted that the dictum on which the petitioners relied
did not provide a resolution to the problem, but merely left the question open.

16 6

Next, the Court focused on the petitioners' "elaboration" on the
"reasonable officer" standard. 167 The petitioners maintained that all
Fourth Amendment inquiries into traffic stops such as the instant one
required the Court to balance the governmental and individual interests involved.' 6 8 The petitioners further asserted that this balancing
did not support the investigation of minor traffic infractions by plainclothes police officers in unmarked vehicles because such investigations "only minimally advanced the government's interest in traffic
safety," and actually might impair the government's interest "by pro169
ducing motorist confusion and alarm."
The Court acknowledged that every case involving the Fourth
Amendment turned upon a "reasonableness" inquiry, and, therefore,
involved "a balancing of all relevant factors." 70 However, the Court
asserted that, except in rare situations that did not apply to the instant
matter, "the result of that balancing is not in doubt where the search
or seizure is based upon probable cause." 17 1 The Court remarked that
actual "balancing" analysis was only necessary in cases such as Delaware
v. Prouse,17 2 which involved police encroachment without probable
cause. 173 In this regard, the Court noted that Prouse expressly distinguished the stop involved in that case from one in which there existed
probable cause to believe that a driver was in violation of a traffic or
accompanying text.
163 414 U.S. 218 (1973). Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1775-76. For further discussion of United
States v. Robinson, see supra notes 30-6 and accompanying text.
164 Wren, 116 S. Ct. at 1775 (emphasis in original).
165 Id.
166 Id. at 1776.
167

Id.

168

Id.

169

Id. Petitioners relied on the D.C. Metropolitan Police regulations to bolster their

contentions. Id.
170 Id.
'71

Id.

172

440 U.S. 648 (1979). For a further discussion of this case, see supranotes 56-59 and

accompanying text.
173

Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1776.
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equipment violation. 174 The Court reiterated the Prouse avowal that
the principal method of enforcing the traffic code is acting upon observed violations of these rules which afforded the "'quantum of individualized suspicion' necessary to ensure that police discretion is
sufficiently constrained." 75 The Court also relied on United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte176 and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce'77 to support the
proposition that the type of detailed "balancing" analysis propounded
by the petitioners was only necessary in cases involving seizures with17 8
out probable cause.
The opinion then addressed cases in which the Supreme Court
performed a "balancing" inquiry despite the existence of probable
cause.1 79 The Court maintained that such cases "involved searches or
seizures conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to
an individual's privacy or even physical interests-such as, for example, seizure by means of deadly force, unannounced entry into a
home, entry into a home without a warrant, or physical penetration of
the body." 8 0 The Court noted that the instant facts did not rise to
such an extreme level.' 8 ' Consequently, the Court maintained that
these facts were "governed by the usual rule that probable cause to
believe the law has been broken 'outbalances' private interest in
82
avoiding police contact."'
Finally, the Court rejected the petitioners' argument that the expansive scope of pertinent traffic and equipment regulations renders
essentially every driver guilty of a violation.' 8 3 The petitioners argued
that a police officer could basically select whomever he or she wished
to stop.' 8 4 The Court maintained that it was not aware of a principle
that would allow it to determine at what point a body of law becomes
so vast "and so commonly violated that an infraction itself could no
longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of enforcement." 18 5
The Court further remarked that, even if it could identify such excessive codes, it did not know by what measure or by what right it could
decide which specific provisions were sufficiently significant to justify
174

Id.

175 Id. (quoting Prioue, 440 U.S. at 654-55).

176 428 U.S. 543, 556-62 (1976) (engaged in "balancing" to uphold checkpoint stops).
177 422 U.S. 873, 882-84 (1975). For a further discussion of this case, see supra notes 4144 and accompanying text.
178 Whren, 116 S.Ct. at 1776.
179 Id.

180 Id. at 1776-77 (citations omitted).
181 Id. at 1777.
182 Id.

183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
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enforcement.186

The Court concluded that there was "no realistic alternative to
the traditional common-law rule that probable cause justifies a search
and seizure" in cases such as the one at hand. 187 It therefore declared
that the officers stop of the petitioners was "reasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment, and the evidence subsequently discovered was
admissible.1 88 Accordingly, the Court upheld the petitioners'
convictions.1 89
V.

ANALYSIS

This Note argues that the Whren Court's holding-that a police
officer's traffic stop is justified by probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred-is problematic. By declining to adopt a
standard that takes police officers' subjective motivations into account, the Court essentially legitimated the purely objective "could"
test. This Note maintains that the Whren court was wrong to adopt this
test for three reasons. First, by ensuring that police officers' underlying subjective intentions are not subject to judicial inquiry, the Court
has effectively given police officers carte-blanche to engage in pretextual activity. This grant of unfettered discretion runs counter to the
Fourth Amendment's proscriptions against arbitrary searches and
seizures. Second, the Court's bright-line rule actually facilitates and,
indeed, protects the use of impermissible factors, such as race or ethnic origin, by police officers to effect traffic stops. While the Court
maintained that the Equal Protection Clause provides a remedy for
such discriminatory stops, this Note contends that this remedy is insufficient. Finally, the Court could have selected an alternative based on
a totality of the circumstances analysis-the "would" test. Given the
grave problems posed by the adoption of the purely objective "could"
test and the competing objectives at issue, this modified objective standard would have been the correct choice.
A.

A BRIGHT-LINE RULE FACILITATES "ARBITRARY" SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES

The Supreme Court's bright-line rule in Whren, which ignores the
subjective motivations of law enforcement officers, not only fails to
protect against arbitrary searches and seizures, but actually facilitates
such invasions. It is well-settled that the Fourth Amendment prohibits
186 Id.
187 Id.

188 Id.
189 Id.
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"arbitrary" searches and seizures. 190 As the Supreme Court has previously recognized, "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is
basic to a free society." 19 1 Indeed, the Fourth Amendment protects
individuals from seizures "conducted at the discretion of executive officials, who may act despotically and capriciously in the exercise of the
power to search and seize," and "it condemns the petty tyranny of
'u 92
unregulated rummagers.
Police officers have been aware of the utility of using minor traffic infractions as pretexts for the investigation of other suspected
crimes even before the Court's decision in Whren. The following actual interview statements by police officers illustrate the problem:
You can always get a guy legitimately on a traffic violation if you tail him
for a while, and then a search can be made.
You don't have to follow a driver very long before he will move to the
other side of the yellow line and then you can arrest and search him for
driving on the wrong side of the highway.
In the event that we see a suspicious automobile or occupant and wish to
search the person or the car, or both, we will usually follow the vehicle
until the driver makes a technical violation 19of
3 a traffic law. Then we
have a means of making a legitimate search.
The Supreme Court was aware of the use of this type of police discretion long before Whren. Indeed, as far back as 1949 Justice Jackson
warned: "We must remember that the extent of every privilege of
search and seizure without warrant which we sustain .... [police] of194
ficers interpret and apply themselves and will push to the limit."
It is not surprising, therefore, that Supreme Court decisions prior
to Whren have repeatedly suggested that pretextual activity is unconstitutional.1 95 In Whren, however, the Court turned its back to the dan190 "Arbitrary" action is that which is "depending on choice or discretion" and "arising
from unrestrained exercise of the will, caprice, or personal preference." WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcrIoNARY 110 (1966).
191 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), overruled in part on other grounds, Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 655 (1961).
192 Amsterdam, supra note 8, at 411.
193 LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY Er AL, DETECTION OF CRIME 131 (1967).
194 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
195 In United States v. LeJkowitz, the Court stated that "[a]n arrest may not be used as a
pretext to search for evidence." 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932). In Abel v. United States, the
Court asserted that a "bad faith" search "would indeed reveal a serious misconduct by lawenforcing officers ....[that] must meet stem resistance by the courts." 362 U.S. 217, 226
(1960). In the landmark Teny v. Ohio decision, the Court stated that "intrusions upon
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate
hunches" were a result that it had "consistently refused to sanction." 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
And in Opperman v. South Dakota, the Court was troubled by pretextual police motives allowed to run rampant and uncontrolled by standard police procedure. See 428 U.S. 364,
376 (1976). Even after its elucidation of an "objective" approach to search and seizure
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gers posed by pretextual police activity, allowing certain police officers
to make an end-run around its own previously-constructed framework
of probable cause and reasonable suspicion. Indeed, by proclaiming
that the subjective motivations of police officers would not be subject
to judicial scrutiny no matter what the specific circumstances of the
detention, the Whren Court has essentially gutted Fourth Amendment
protections against arbitrary searches and seizures.
Given the scope of local traffic codes and the facility with which a
police officer so inclined can identify minor traffic violations, limiting
traffic stops to those in which a police officer has witnessed such an
infraction, as the Court did here, "is, as a practical matter, no limitation at all."19 6 After Whren, picayune traffic violations, such as "[a]
string hanging from the rearview mirror, a tire touching the shoulder
stripe, a lane change signal a moment too brief, or a pause at a stop
sign to look at a map, are all unquestionable grounds for seizure
.... 197 Therefore, after Whren
if a police officer wants to stop someone for questioning and perhaps a
search, but has no constitutional grounds for doing so, he need only wait
until the individual gets into his car, follow him until he inevitably violates one of the myriad traffic regulations that rule the road, and use
that infraction as a pretext for a stop. 19 8
A police officer can also contrive a traffic violation ex post facto to
justify an otherwise unlawful intrusion. Thus, in the wake of Court's
ruling in Whren, a motorist can be subjected "to unfettered governmental intrusion every time [he or she] ente[rs] an automobile."' 99
Unfortunately, there is an even greater danger underlying the
Whren court's enormous grant of discretionary power to the police to
effect temporary detentions of vehicles. Using these seizures, the government can "do indirectly through the use of a combination of
Fourth Amendment exceptions what it cannot do directly."20 0 First, a
police officer can effect a traffic stop using a minor traffic violation as
a basis. The officer can then arrest the driver for the infraction, and
perform, as incidental to the arrest, searches of both the driver's perissues beginning with Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978), the Supreme Court demonstrated concern with pretextual police activity in cases such as Colorado v. Bannister, 440
U.S. 1 (1980) (per curiam), Coloradov. Bertine 479 U.S. 367 (1987), New York v. Burge, 483
U.S. 691 (1987), and Foridav. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990). These decisions suggest that the
Court has always exhibited concern over police officers' subjective motives, albeit through
objective means of measurement. See Campbell, supra note 29, at 294.
196 Brief for the Petitioners at 29, Whren v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996) (No.
95-5841).
197 Id.
198 David Cole, See No Evil Hear No Evil RECORDER, Aug. 28, 1996, at 4.
199 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
200 Pulliam, supra note 10, at 492.
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son and automobile, effectively "bootstrapping" the search onto the
valid traffic stop.2 0 1 As one commentator noted:
This combination of exceptions results in a Fourth Amendment warrant
doctrine that an informed police force can use in tandem to construct a
constitutionally valid pretextual search of an individual's vehicle based
solely on a broken tail light or speeding violation. Thus,
the whole can
202
become greater than the sum of its individual parts.

The egregious end-result is that an individual can lose all Fourth
Amendment protections against arbitrary seizures and searches when
2 03
he or she gets behind the wheel of a car.

Since its decision in Whren, the Court has further exacerbated the
problem. In the term immediately following Whren, the Court, in Ohio
v. Robinette,2°4 ruled that once police have stopped a car for a traffic
violation, they may go on to ask the driver's permission to search the
car without first informing the driver that the routine, traffic detention is over, and that he or she is, in fact, "free to go."20 5 In the wake
201 Regarding the search of the arrestee's person after the arrest, see United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 222-23 n.2 (1973) (full search of arrestee's person is permitted for

every custodial arrest, including those for minor traffic infractions); Gustafson v. Florid,
414 U.S. 260, 265 (1973) ("[i]t is sufficient that the officer had probable cause to arrest the
petitioner and that he lawfully effectuated the arrest and placed the petitioner in custody
... [T]he arguable absence of 'evidentiary' purpose for a search incident to a lawful arrest
is not controlling."). Regarding the search of the arrestee's car after an arrest, see New York
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (police officer, as contemporaneous incident of lawful
custodial arrest of automobile's occupant, may search auto's passenger compartment and
any containers found therein) (footnote omitted). For a discussion of"bootstrapping," see
generally Pulliam, supranote 10, at 492-93.
202 Pulliam, supra note 10, at 493.
203 Indeed, police officers bent on conducting a search of a person's car now can use
the traffic code in essentially the same way as British customs officers used the hated writs
of assistance in colonial America. Arguably one of the major impetuses of the Revolutionary War, the "writs of assistance" gave British customs officers the unrestricted authority to
forcibly enter private homes and rummage indiscriminately. This author argues that the
test enunciated in Whren grants, asJames Otis said in his fiery arguments against the writs
of assistance, "a power that places the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty
officer." John Adams, Abstract of the Argument, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OFJOHN ADAMs 141-42

(L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965). For a discussion of the writs of assistance,
see generally M.H. SMITH, THE WRrrs OF ASSISTANCE CASE (1978). For a discussion of how

the writs of assistance influenced the drafters of the Fourth Amendment, see Amsterdam,
supra note 8, at 398-99.
204 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996).
205 See id. at 421. In Robinette, a sheriff's deputy stopped the defendant for speeding on
an interstate highway in Ohio. The deputy conducted a background check, and finding
the defendant's documents in order, gave him a warning and returned his driver's license.
Id. at 419. At this point, the deputy asked the defendant, "One question before you get
gone: Are you carrying any illegal contraband in your car? Any weapons of any kind,
drugs, anything like that?" Id. (quoting App. to Brief for Respondent 2 (internal quotation
marks omitted)). The defendant answered "no" to these questions, and the deputy then
asked if he could search the car. Id. The defendant consented, and the deputy searched
the car, finding a small quantity of marijuana and a pill of methylenediox-
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of Robinette, a police officer may now use Whren as the constitutional
basis to effect a traffic stop for a picayune infraction, and then "'turn
[the] routine traffic stop into a fishing expedition for unrelated crimi20 6
nal activity.'"
In its most recent case involving traffic stops-Mayland v. Wilson 2 0 7 -the Court granted police officers the ability to order passengers out of the vehicles they stop, even without any suspicion that the
passenger has committed a crime or presents a threat to the officer's
safety.208 In his dissent, Justice Kennedy acknowledged the dangers
lurking in Whren, asserting that "[t]he practical effect of [the Court's]
holding in Wren... is to allow police to stop vehicles in almost countless circumstances." 20 9 Kennedy further maintained that the rule announced in Wilson, when coupled with the Court's prior Whren
decision, "puts tens of millions of passengers at risk of arbitrary control by the police." 210 Indeed, cases such as Robinette and Wilson are
indicative of the further "whittling away" of Fourth Amendment protections for individuals who use automobiles.
B.

A BRIGHT-LINE RULE FACILITATES AND PROTECTS DISCRIMINATORY
ENFORCEMENT BASED ON IMPERMISSIBLE FACTORS

Besides undercutting the protections of the Fourth Amendment
in a general sense, the Whren court's bright-line rule condoning
pretextual police activity actually facilitates and protects discriminatory enforcement. As one federal judge commented:
The risk inherent in such a practice is that some police officers will use
the pretext of traffic violations or other minor infractions to harass
members of groups identified by factors that are totally impermissible as
a basis for law enforcement activity-f-actors such as race or ethnic ori-

gin, or simply appearances that some police officers do not
like, such as
21
young men with long hair, jewelry, and flashy clothing. '
Therefore, if the Fourth Amendment is "concerned with avoiding inymethamphetamine ("ecstasy"). Id.
206 Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Upholds Police Methods in Vehicle Drug Searches, N.Y.
TmES, Nov. 19, 1996, at A23 (quoting the Ohio Supreme Court).
207 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
208 See id. at 886. In Wilson, a state trooper pulled over a car for speeding on an interstate highway in Maryland. During the encounter, the state trooper "noticed that the
front-seat passenger... was sweating and.., appeared extremely nervous," and ordered
the passenger out of the vehicle. Id. at 884. As the passenger obeyed the state trooper's
order and exited the car, a quantity of crack cocaine fell to the ground. Id.
209 Id. at 890 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
210 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
211 United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 785-86 (2d Cir. 1994) (Newman, CJ.,
concurring).
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defensible inequities in treatment," 21 2 the Court's ruling further undercuts the goals of the Fourth Amendment.
1.

The Impact on Members of Minority Groups

While the Whren Court's enormous grant of discretionary power
to police officers impacts upon all motorists, some will, inevitably, be
more affected than others. Indeed, members of minority groups will
be most affected, as evidence supports the proposition that they are
already the victims of discriminatory enforcement in the context of
2 13
traffic stops.
In 1992, reporters from the Orlando Sentinel obtained 148 hours
of videotaped traffic stops from the Sheriff's drug squad in Volusia
County, Florida.214 The videos, which were made by dash-mounted
cameras in deputies' cars, documented 1,084 traffic stops of motorists
along Interstate 95.215 After viewing the videos, the reporters found
that while African-Americans and Hispanics accounted for only five
percent of the drivers on the highway, they accounted for almost 70
percent of those stopped. 21 6 Of the cars that were searched, more
2 17
than 80 percent were driven by African-Americans and Hispanics.
Most stops were for minor violations, such as "following too closely,"
"swerving," "speeding 1-10 mph over limit," and "burned out tag
light."2 18 Although all of the stops were reportedly based on such legitimate traffic infractions, less than one percent-only nine drivers
out of the 1,084 drivers stopped-actually received traffic tickets. 2 19
The videos also showed that, on average, stops of African-American
and Hispanic drivers lasted over twice as long as those of white driv2 20
ers-12.1 minutes vs. 5.1 minutes.
Other examples of the practice abound. A NewJersey state court
judge reviewing traffic stops that occurred on the New Jersey Turnpike between 1988 and 1991 discovered that even though there was
212 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 97 (1980). For a discussion of how the
Fourth Amendment is "an another harbinger of the Equal Protection Clause," see id at 9697.
213 For a complete and detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see generally David A.
Harris, Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenmes: The Supreme Court and Pretextual
Traffic Stops, 87J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997).
214 Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Color of Driveris Key to Stops in 1-95 Vdeos, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 23, 1992, at Al. For a detailed discussion of this activity in Volusia County, see
also Harris, supra note 213, at 561-63.
215 Brazil & Berry, supra note 214, at Al.
216 Id.
217

Id.

218
219
220

Id.
Id.
Id.
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no notable racial distinction in observable traffic violations, there was
a large racial disparity in the drivers who were stopped. 22 1 While African-Americans constituted 13.5 percent of drivers on the road, they
constituted 46 percent of those stopped. 222 Along the same lines,
records maintained by the Maryland State Police indicate that of the
732 motorists stopped and searched from January 1995 through June
1996, 79 percent of them were African-American and five percent
were Hispanic. 2 23 Indeed, pretextual traffic stops are so repeatedly
targeted at African-Americans that such stops have ironically come to
be known in the African-American community as "DWB"-"Driving
224
While Black."
2.

The Insufficiency of Equal Protection Clause-based Remedies

Perhaps the most problematic implication of Whren is that, even if
affirmative evidence exists that an officer effecting a traffic stop subjectively relied on an unconstitutional pretextual basis, such as the
motorist's race or ethnic origin, the constitutionality of the stop is not
an issue so long as the officer can claim that he or she was acting in
response to an observed "traffic violation." While the Whren court
noted that the Constitution prohibits "selective enforcement of the
law based on considerations such as race,"22 5 the Court asserted that
the proper tool to challenge such impermissible stops is the Equal
Protection Clause.2 2 6 The Court's reliance on the Equal Protection
Clause, however, is problematic and impracticable. Indeed, after
Wren, such impermissible traffic stops are virtually unchallengeable
on constitutional grounds.
a. The Equal Protection Clause and the Selective Enforcement
Claim
The Equal Protection Clause gives rise to selective enforcement
and selective prosecution claims "because discriminatory application
of the law amounts to a denial of equal justice."2 2 7 A selective enforcement claim can form the basis for a civil suit for monetary damages or
injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or can be raised as an affirmative defense to a criminal charge.2 28 Such a claim does not assail a
221

Cole, supra note 198, at 4.

222 Id.
223 Harris, supra note 213, at 563-66 (citing statistics gathered by the Maryland State
Police).
224 Cole, supra note 198, at 4. See also Harris, supra note 213, at 560-61.
225 United States v. Whren, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996).
226 Id.
227 Buckenberger, supra note 50, at 492-93.
228 Id. at 493.
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case's merits. 2 -9 Rather, the claim challenges police enforcement of a
law against one person and the lack of enforcement of that same law
230
against others who are as apparently equally liable and discernible.
The selective enforcement remedy is appealing because it allows the
introduction of incriminating evidence at a criminal trial, while still
providing a remedy for the violation of a defendant's constitutional
rights. The effectiveness of the selective enforcement remedy is dubious, however, because of the strict legal standards necessary to establish a claim and the practical improbability of winning on the
23 1
merits.
b.

Problems with Establishing a Selective Enforcement Claim

A selective enforcement claim is to be judged according to "ordinary equal protection standards."2 3 2 To succeed, an individual must
show (1) that the practice of selective enforcement "had a discriminatory effect" and (2) "that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose."23 3

As to the first element, it is highly unlikely that a claimant

could introduce the requisite proof of specific instances of nonenforcement.23 4 For example, while traffic citation records show how
often the traffic laws are enforced, they do not indicate how often
such violations are disregarded. 23 5 With regards to the second element, even if a plaintiff is able to obtain the requisite evidence of
nonenforcement, this evidence will probably be insufficient to show
that the officer was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.2 3 6 Indeed,
courts are not generally willing to infer discriminatory intent solely
from nonenforcement statistics, and additional evidence of intent will
23 7
most likely be in police departments' control.
A claimant attempting to raise a selective enforcement claim is, as
one commentator noted, "placed in a Catch-22 type bind . . . [because] [he or she] cannot obtain discovery unless [he or] she first
makes a threshold showing .... Yet making a sufficient preliminary
showing of discriminatory intent may be impossible without some discovery." 23 8 Because of the deficiency of documentary evidence denot229 Id. at 492.
230 Id. (citation omitted).
231 Id. See also id. at 498.
232 Wayte v. United States,

470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985).

233 Id.
234 Buckenberger, supra note 50, at 496-97.
235 Id. at 497.
236 Id.
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238 Steven Alan Reiss, ProsecutorialIntent in ConstitutionalCriminalProcedu, 135 U. PA. L.
R1v. 1365, 1373-74 (1987).
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ing nonenforcement and the impediments to obtaining discovery of
evidence, the selective enforcement claimant may ironically be compelled to rely on the arresting officer's testimony in order to succeed.23 9 Indeed, "[a]n equal protection claim in the selective traffic
enforcement setting would require determination of the very subjective intent of the officer that [the Supreme Court in Whren stated] is
240
so difficult to establish."
Besides the above obstacles to establishing legal sufficiency, there
are other practical difficulties with the Court's exclusive reliance on
the Equal Protection Clause to remedy a pattern of impermissible discrimination in the context of traffic stops. 2 4 ' First, it is not likely that
ajury will award significant monetary damages to an individual who
has been convicted of a crime.2 42 Indeed, even given statutory guarantees of minimum recovery, empathy for the claimant is often necessary to establish liability.2 43 Second, it is debatable whether monetary

damages constitute adequate compensation to an individual who has
been incarcerated as a result of selective enforcement.2 44 Finally, in
the case of a defendant who has been convicted based on evidence
obtained as a result of selective enforcement, institution of a selective
enforcement action for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
245
may be prevented by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
3.

Consequences of the Insufficient Remedy

The inability of the Equal Protection Clause to curb discriminatory application the laws in the context of traffic stops has grave consequences. The perception that the law discriminates on the basis of
factors such as race erodes respect for the criminal justice system. As
one criminologist stated:
The ability of police to do their jobs efficiently and effectively presupposes a high level of community support and cooperation. If everyone
becomes distrustful of the police, or worse yet, fearful of them, you create a dangerous vacuum
in between law enforcement and the public in
2 46
which everyone loses.
On this same note, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
239

Buckenberger, supra note 50, at 497.

240 Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 19, Whren v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996)
(No. 95-5841).
241 Buckenberger, supra note 50, at 498.
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Circuit stated, "Nothing can corrode respect for the law more than
the knowledge that the government looks beyond the law itself to arbitrary considerations such as race . . . as a basis for determining its
applicability." 247 One commentator has described the perception that
the law is enforced discriminatorily against African-Americans as
"[the single greatest threat to the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system." 248 This same commentator notes that "[t] he cost of that perception is revealed in all sorts of ways, from the racially divided reactions to the OJ. Simpson verdict [in the criminal case], to the
persistently high crime rate in the black community." 249 No matter
which way, it is clear that this situation can only do harm.
C.

THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ADOPTED THE "WOULD" TEST, WHICH
TAKES LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS' SUBJECTIVE MOTIVATIONS
INTO ACCOUNT, AND IS CONSISTENT WITH SUPREME
COURT PRECEDENT

The root of the problem with the Whren decision lies in the
Court's resolution that a police officer's subjective motivations are irrelevant in an analysis of the constitutionality of a search or seizure. 250
On the contrary, the Court should have adopted the modified objective "would" test, as it takes police officers' subjective motivations into
account in a way that is consistent with Supreme Court precedent, and
better addresses the competing objectives at issue.
In reaching its conclusion, the Whren court relied on its prior de25 2
cisions in Scott v. United States,251 United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,
253
and United States v. Robinson.
While these cases suggest that police
officers' subjective motivations should be beyond judicial inquiry, they
do not foreclose courts from second-guessing "police conduct for its
comportment with the underlying policies that inform the amendment,"254 nor do they suggest "that an officer's possible or likely motives are never material to the Fourth Amendment inquiry."25 5 In fact,
"[t]he whole point of Fourth Amendment doctrine has been to send
247 Cole, supra note 198, at 4 (quoting the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit).
248 Id.
249 Id.

250 See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct 1769, 1774 (1996).

251 436 U.S. 128 (1978). For a discussion of this case, see supranotes 49-55 and accompanying text.
252 462 U.S. 579 (1983). For a discussion of this case, see supra note 55.
253 414 U.S. 218 (1983). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.
254 Campbell, supra note 29, at 293.
255 Id.

892

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[Vol. 87

messages to officers about their conduct in order to protect constitutional values." 256 Therefore, it would not make sense to ignore the
actual reasons that police officers act, and, instead, only consider
whether there might be a satisfactory reason that could justify the behavior of the police officer.2 57 Indeed, "[n] othing in [the Supreme]
Court's Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence... requires a trial judge to
ignore evidence of unconstitutional motive when it comes to light." 258
With this in mind, the proper standard to be applied in the context of determining the constitutionality of traffic stops is the "would"
test, which asks whether, under the same circumstances, a "reasonable
officer" would have made the stop for the reason given. 259 This modified objective standard is no different from the Terry v. Ohio framework which has been "applied in every other variety of brief, on-thestreet seizure... "260 In Terry, the Court held that seizures are permissible only if they are shown to be objectively reasonable in light of the
totality of the circumstances. 26 1 The point of Terry is:
that while the officer's actual subjective motives in making a search or
seizure may be beyond judicial scrutiny, the "objective" officer test-the
"man of reasonable caution" hypothesized-is a means of ensuring compliance with a minimum standard that, in its application, eliminates a
great deal of police conduct tainted with subjectively improper motives
-- While the test may be an "objective" one, the evil it is aimed at-the
"hunch"-is most assuredly a creature of the officer's subjective
62
2

consciousness.

Using the "would" test, police officers' subjective intentions are not
the sole factor in the constitutional analysis. As under the Terry rationale, they are but one part of the totality of the circumstances analysis.
Despite claims that the "would" standard is unworkable, the Teny
foundation has been applied successfully to a wide variety of factual
situations since it was announced in 1968.265 For example, deciding
whether a reasonable officer would effect a stop for a minor traffic
infraction is no more arduous than determining the reasonableness of
256 Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union at 32, Whren (No. 955841).
257 Id.
258 Id. at 15.
259 For a further discussion of the "would" test, see supra notes 91-98 and accompanying
text.
260 BriefAmicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 17, Whren

(No. 95-5841). Importantly, the Terry standard was acknowledged by the Court in arriving
at its decision in Scott-a case upon which the Whren Court relied. See Scott v. United
States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978).
261 Id. at 10-11 (discussing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
262 Campbell, supra note 29, at 293-94.
263 Brief Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal liefense Lawyers at 10, Whren
(No. 95-5841).
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a seizure based on innumerable observations in complicated, multiple-suspect cases in which knowledge and data are exchanged between police officers from different agencies with different
interests.2 6 4 Also important is the fact that most state courts addressing the issue have followed the objective totality of the circumstances
model. 26 5 This is significant because "[w]hile the federal courts are

primarily responsible for interpreting and enforcing the Constitution,
the state courts quite naturally have far greater experience with the
2 66
enforcement of traffic laws."
The notion that the "would" test usurps the legislature's law-making function is also misplaced. Despite claims to the contrary, the
"would" test does not presume that traffic violation arrests are per se
unconstitutional. 2 67 While legislatures are authorized to determine
the most appropriate means for law enforcement, courts are "entrusted with [duties] as guardians of the Bill of Rights to apply limitations upon the legislature's power."2 68 Indeed, as one commentator
stated, "[1]egislative mandates cannot insulate police conduct from
269
constitutional review."
In fairness, the modified objective "would" test is not ideal. However, given the tremendous negative implications of the purely objective "could" test, the "would" test, which is supported by Supreme
Court precedent, is the most viable alternative.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Whren v. United States, the Supreme Court, in upholding the
traffic stop at issue, adopted the "could test," holding that a police
officer's traffic stop is justified by probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.2 70 The Court concluded that police officers' subjective motives were irrelevant in an analysis of the
constitutionality of searches and seizures, asserting that "[s]ubjective
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amend27 1
ment analysis."
The Court's decision in Whren is problematic for three reasons.
First, by insuring that police officers' underlying subjective motivations are irrelevant in an analysis of the constitutionality of a search
264
265
266
267
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and seizure, the Court has given police officers the unfettered ability
to engage in pretextual activity. This grant of unhindered discretion
runs squarely counter to the Fourth Amendment's proscriptions
against arbitrary searches and seizures. Second, the Court's brightline rule actually facilitates and protects the utilization of impermissible factors, such as race or ethnic origin, by police officers in effecting
traffic stops. While the Court maintained that the Equal Protection
Clause provides a remedy for such discriminatory stops, this remedy is
insufficient, and has threatening implications. Finally, the Court
should have selected an alternative standard-the "would" testwhich takes police officers' subjective motivations into account as one
of the factors in "totality of the circumstances" analysis. Given the
grave problems posed by the adoption of the purely objective "could"
test and the competing objectives at issue, the Court should have
adopted this modified objective standard.
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